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Recently, Chau [1] introduced an experimentally feasible qudit-based quantum-key-distribution
(QKD) scheme. In that scheme, one bit of information is phase encoded in the prepared state in
a 2n-dimensional Hilbert space in the form (|i〉 ± |j〉)/√2 with n ≥ 2. For each qudit prepared
and measured in the same two-dimensional Hilbert subspace, one bit of raw secret key is obtained
in the absence of transmission error. Here we show that by modifying the basis announcement
procedure, the same experimental setup can generate n bits of raw key for each qudit prepared
and measured in the same basis in the noiseless situation. The reason is that in addition to the
phase information, each qudit also carries information on the Hilbert subspace used. The additional
(n− 1) bits of raw key comes from a clever utilization of this extra piece of information. We prove
the unconditional security of this modified protocol and compare its performance with other existing
provably secure qubit- and qudit-based protocols on market in the one-way classical communication
setting. Interestingly, we find that for the case of n = 2, the secret key rate of this modified protocol
using non-degenerate random quantum code to perform one-way entanglement distillation is equal
to that of the six-state scheme.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 89.70.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Prepare-and-measure-based quantum-key-distribution
(PM-QKD) protocol is a class of practical schemes in
which the sender Alice prepares a quantum state and
sends it through an insecure channel to the receiver
Bob, who measures the received state so as to estab-
lish a shared raw key. Then, they apply classical post-
processing to the raw key to distill a secure final key [2].
While early PM-QKD protocols such as the well-known
BB84 scheme [3] use unentangled qubits as quantum in-
formation carriers, various authors proposed using qu-
dits instead [1, 2, 4–8]. Generally speaking, qudit-based
schemes are more error tolerant than qubit-based ones.
However, qudit-based schemes are generally very hard to
implement in practice partly because of the difficulty in
preparing a general qudit state with high fidelity. Two
notable exceptions are the recently proposed round-robin
differential-phase-shift (RRDPS) scheme [8] and the so-
called Chau15 scheme [1].
Recall that for the Chau15 scheme, Alice randomly
picks two distinct elements i, j from the Galois field
GF (2n) with n ≥ 2 and prepares a state in the form
(|i〉±|j〉)/√2, where {|i〉 : i ∈ GF (2n)} is an orthonormal
basis of the 2n-dimensional Hilbert space. After receiv-
ing this state from Alice, Bob randomly picks two dis-
tinct elements i′, j′ ∈ GF (2n) and projectively measures
the state along {(|i′〉 ± |j′〉)/√2. The Chau15 scheme is
experimentally feasible because in the time bin represen-
tation, the preparation and measurement procedures are
∗ Corresponding author, email: hfchau@hku.hk
almost identical to those for diagonal basis qubits [1]. In
this regard, we call these preparation and measurement
states qubit-like. The security of the Chau15 scheme
originates from the fact that for n ≥ 2, the values of
i, j, i′, j′ used, and hence the Hilbert subspace picked dur-
ing the preparation and measurement of these qubit-like
states, are withheld from the eavesdropper Eve until af-
ter Bob’s measurement. Clearly, Alice and Bob should
get a shared raw bit of key encoded in the phase of the
prepared qudit should {i, j} = {i′, j′}. In other words,
the Chau15 scheme is able to generate one bit of raw
secret key per successful transfer of each 2n-dimensional
qudit provided that it is prepared and measured in the
same Hilbert subspace [1].
Here we show that the Chau15 scheme can be modified
so that the number of raw secret bits generated per each
such successful qudit transfer can be increased from 1 to
n. We do it by replacing the announcement procedures
for the Hilbert subspaces used to the preparation and
measurement bases. In this way, the (n−1) classical bits
used to describe the Hilbert subspace information of each
prepare and measure qubit-like qudit state, which is also
withheld from Eve until Bob’s measurement, can then be
used to generate part of the raw key. More importantly,
there is no need to change the hardware setup of the
Chau15 scheme in this modification.
In Sec. II, we first introduce an entanglement-
distillation-based quantum key distribution (ED-QKD)
protocol known as Scheme A. Then, we use Shor-Preskill
argument [2, 9] to show that Scheme A can be re-
duced to two equally secure PM-QKD protocols known
as Schemes B and C. In particular, the state preparation
and measurement procedures in Scheme C are identical
2to that of the Chau15 scheme. We then prove the uncon-
ditional security of Scheme A and give key rate formulas
under one-way entanglement distillation for Schemes A–
C in Sec. III. We also compare the performance of our
schemes to various provably secure qubit- and qudit-
based PM-QKD schemes in the literature using one-way
entanglement distillation in Sec. III. In particular, we find
that for the case of n = 2, the secret key rate of Scheme B
is equal to that of the six-state scheme [10] when both use
non-degenerate random quantum codes to perform one-
way entanglement distillation. Finally, we briefly discuss
the experimental feasibility of Schemes B and C.
II. THE MODIFIED SCHEMES
A. The Entanglement-Distillation-Based Scheme
Known As Scheme A
Let N ≡ 2n with n ≥ 2 and consider the following
ED-QKD scheme known as Scheme A.1 (The descrip-
tion below extensively uses a lot of finite field arithmetic.
Readers may consult Ref. [11] for an introduction.)
The Modified ED-QKD Scheme (Scheme A).
1. Alice secretly and randomly picks [a] ∈
GF (N)/GF (2) and λ ∈ GF (N)∗ ≡ GF (N) \ {0}.
She prepares the state
∑
i¯∈GF (2) |¯i + [a]〉A ⊗ |¯i +
[a]〉B/
√
2, where all arithmetic in the ket state
are performance in the finite field GF (N). She
applies the linear transformation Lλ|i〉 7→ |λi〉 for
all i ∈ GF (N) to the second qudit before sending
it through an insecure quantum channel to Bob.
2. Upon reception of the state from Alice, Bob secretly
and randomly picks λ′ ∈ GF (N) and applies the
linear transformation L−1λ′ to his received state.
3. Alice and Bob jot down the joint measurement re-
sult along the basis
B = { 1√
2
∑
i¯∈GF (2)
(−1)i¯c¯|¯i + [a]〉A ⊗ |¯i + [a] + b〉B
: [a] ∈ GF (N)/GF (2), b ∈ GF (N),
c¯ ∈ GF (2)}
≡ {|Φ[a],b,c¯〉} (1)
to their shared quantum state. Then, they publicly
announce the values of λ, λ′ used and keep the state
only if λ = λ′. They repeat steps 1–3 until they
have enough shared pairs.
1 From now on, we use the convention that a variable in Roman,
square-bracketed, overbarred and Greek alphabet are in GF (N),
GF (N)/GF (2), GF (2) and GF (N)∗, respectively.
4. Alice and Bob pick a random sample from their re-
maining measured states and reveal the values of
b and c¯ obtained for each of the selected states for
various λ’s and [a]’s to estimate the error rate of
the channel. Specifically, let e˜bc¯ be the probabil-
ity that Alice prepares the state |Φ[a],0,0〉 and that
the resultant state measured by Alice and Bob is
|Φ[a],b,c¯〉 for some [a] ∈ GF (N)/GF (2). Then, by
revealing the values of b and c¯ from a random sam-
ple of those shared states to which Alice and Bob
have applied I ⊗ Lλ and I ⊗ L−1λ , they obtain an
estimate of the value of e˜λ[b],c¯ + e˜λ([b]+1),c¯ for all
[b] ∈ GF (N)/GF (2) and c¯ ∈ GF (2). They pro-
ceed only if the error rate is sufficiently small. (We
shall discuss the smallness criterion later on in the
unconditional security proof in Sec. III.)
5. Alice and Bob apply one- or two-way entanglement
distillation similar to the ones used in Refs. [1, 7, 9,
12, 13] to the remaining states to distill out almost
perfect EPR-like states each in the form |Φ[a],0,0〉.
For instance, they apply a Calderbank-Shor-Steane
(CSS) quantum error-correcting code [14–17] that
could correct the measured spin-flip and phase er-
rors of the channel in step 4. (Note that such a
CSS code is constructed using a classical N -ary
code C1 and a classical binary code C2 obeying
{0} ⊂ C2 ⊂ C1 via the standard CSS construc-
tion. This is possible for a binary code can be
regarded as an N -ary code by extending the lin-
ear coding space over the field GF (2) to the linear
space over the field GF (N). In fact, we may extend
the dual code of the binary code C2 to an N -ary
code with the same minimum distance using the
same trick. In this way, C1 and C2 can be used to
correct spin-flip and phase errors in this noisy and
insecure channel, respectively. More importantly,
the choice of C1 could depend on the error syn-
drome measurement results of the code C2 just like
the one used by Lo in Ref. [12].)
6. Finally, Alice and Bob separately measure each of
their share of the almost perfect EPR-like states
along the basis B1, where
Bλ = { 1√
2
∑
i¯∈GF (2)
(−1)i¯c¯|λ(¯i + [a])〉 :
[a] ∈ GF (N)/GF (2), c¯ ∈ GF (2)} (2)
for all λ ∈ GF (N)∗. In this way, they obtain n bits
of shared secret key per EPR-like state measured—
1 bit comes from the phase information c¯ and (n−
1) bits come from the value of [a] ∈ GF (N)/GF (2).
We remark that in the absence of noise and Eve, Alice
and Bob should get b = c¯ = 0 for each pair of tested
quantum particles in step 4. And in this case, they share
a copy of the EPR-like state |Φ[a],0,0〉 per qudit transfer
3just after step 3. A simple-minded way to understand
the origin of security of this scheme is that as Alice puts
each shared EPR-like state in a Hilbert subspace, which
is not known to Eve, she has a non-negligible chance of
disturbing the signal if she guesses this subspace incor-
rectly.
B. Reduction To Two Prepare-And-Measure-Based
Schemes Known As Schemes B And C
Consider the unitary operation BADD for Alice and
Bob to separately add their first qudit to their second
qudit in the computational basis. Clearly,
BADD(|Φ[a],b,c¯〉 ⊗ |Φ[a′],b′,c¯′〉)
= |Φ[a],b,c¯−c¯′〉 ⊗ |Φ[a]+[a′],b+b′,c¯′〉. (3)
Consider also the unitary operation that acts on the com-
putational basis according to
H(|b〉) =
{
(|b〉+ |b+ 1〉)/√2 if b ∈ GF (N)/GF (2),
(−|b〉+ |b + 1〉)/√2 otherwise.
(4)
Then
H ⊗H(|Φ[a],b,c¯〉) = (−1)b¯0 |Φ[a],b+b¯0+c¯,b¯0〉
= (−1)b¯0 |Φ[a],[b]+c¯,b¯0〉 (5)
up to a global phase, where b¯0 ∈ GF (2) denotes the con-
stant term of the degree-(n−1) polynomial expression for
b in GF (2)[x]. Clearly, both H ⊗H and BADD map ba-
sis states in B to itself up to an overall phase. Since the
error-correction and privacy amplification procedure us-
ing the specially designed CSS code in step 5 of Scheme A
involvesH⊗H , BADD, standard basis measurement plus
local quantum operation by Bob only, therefore Alice
may push her final measurement forward in time. By
the Shor-Preskill argument [7, 9], we obtain an equally
secure PM-QKD scheme that we called Scheme B.
To find the corresponding channel error estimation
method for this equally secure Scheme B, we consider
the linear operators [16, 17]
Xu|i〉 = |i+ u〉 and Zu|i〉 = (−1)Tr(ui)|i〉 (6)
for all u ∈ GF (N), where Tr(i) = i+ i2 + i4 + · · ·+ iN/2
is the absolute trace of i. Then
L−1λ XuZvLλ = Xλ−1uZλv. (7)
Recall that in Scheme A, Alice first prepares the state
|Φ[a],0,0〉. Consider those shared states to which Alice
and Bob have applied the operations I⊗Lλ and I⊗L−1λ ,
respectively. Suppose Alice and Bob separately measure
these shared states after passing through the insecure
channel in the B1 basis. Suppose further that Alice in-
forms Bob of her measurement outcomes. Then from
Eqs. (2) and (5)–(7), Bob could deduce [λ−1u] + Tr(λv)
and hence both [λ−1u] and Tr(λv) as these two variables
are linearly independent over GF (2). Since the solution
of the equation [λ−1u] = [b] is u = λ[b] or u = λ([b] + 1),
the outcomes of the above measurement by Alice and Bob
give estimates of e˜λ[b],c¯ + e˜λ([b]+1),c¯ for all λ ∈ GF (N)∗,
[b] ∈ GF (N)/GF (2) and c¯ ∈ GF (2). Hence, our ED-
QKD Scheme A can be reduced to the following equally
secure PM-QKD Scheme B.
The Modified PM-QKD Scheme (Scheme B).
1. Alice randomly picks λ ∈ GF (N)∗ and prepares
one of the basis states in Bλ by randomly selecting
the parameters [a] and c¯. He sends the state to
Bob.
2. Upon reception, Bob randomly picks λ′ ∈ GF (N)∗
and measures his received state in the Bλ′ basis.
3. They publicly announce the values of λ, λ′ used and
keep their state only if λ = λ′. They add the pa-
rameters ([a], c¯) describing their prepared and mea-
sured states to their raw key string. They repeat
steps 1–3 until they have a sufficiently long raw key.
4. They estimate the values of e˜λ[b],c¯ + e˜λ([b]+1),c¯ by
revealing (and discarding) a random sample of dits
from the raw key to which Alice and Bob have ap-
plied I⊗Lλ and I⊗L−1λ , respectively. They proceed
only if the error rate is sufficiently small.
5. Alice and Bob apply classical error correction and
privacy amplification to their remaining raw keys
based on the classical N -ary code C1 and classical
binary code C2 obeying {0} ⊂ C2 ⊂ C1. Moreover,
C1 may be picked depending on the error syndrome
of C2 just like the privacy amplification procedure
reported in Ref. [12]. Specifically, we denote the
(N/2)-ary vector formed by the [a]’s and the binary
vector formed by the c¯’s in Alice’s remaining raw
key by ~a and ~c, respectively. Alice announces the
error syndromes for C1 of ~a and C2 of ~c. Bob sub-
tracts them from his corresponding measured error
syndromes and then uses the subtracted results to
perform classical error corrections using codes C1
(C2) on his remaining raw key ~a
′ (~c′). For a suffi-
ciently low noise level, the Bob’s raw key after error
correction should agree with Alice’s. They now use
the cosets ~a + C1 and ~c + C2 as their shared final
key.
Note that Scheme B is analogous to the Chau15 scheme
in Ref. [1]. The most notable difference is that unlike the
Chau15 scheme, the two-dimensional Hilbert subspaces
used in state preparation and measurement are not re-
vealed in Scheme B.
Since each element in Bλ can be rewritten in the form
(|i〉 ± |j〉)/√2 for some i 6= j ∈ GF (N), the state prepa-
ration of Scheme B in step 1 is exactly the same as that
4of the Chau15. While the state measurement procedure
of Scheme B in step 2 is a complete measurement and is
different from the incomplete measurement used in the
Chau15, we could further change this step in Scheme B
to step 2’ below so that the hardware setup is identical to
that of the Chau15 scheme. We call this further modified
protocol Scheme C.
The Further Modified PM-QKD Scheme
(Scheme C).
2’. Upon reception, Bob randomly picks λ′ ∈ GF (N)∗,
[a′] ∈ GF (N)/GF (2) and measures his received
state along {|λ′[a′]〉 ± |λ′(1 + [a′])〉}/√2. (Clearly,
this is equivalent to randomly picking i′ 6= j′ ∈
GF (N) and measuring the received state along
(|i′〉 ± |j′〉)/√2 as in the measurement step in the
Chau15 scheme.) Bob informs Alice to ignore her
parameters λ, [a] and c¯ and repeat her state prepa-
ration and sending procedures in step 1 of Scheme B
in case his measurement fails.
Note that Schemes B and C are equally secure. The rea-
son is that Eve’s action on the qudits cannot depend on
the values of λ′’s and [a]’s used for she has no knowl-
edge of them when the qudits pass through the insecure
quantum channel. Consequently, the error rates e˜bc¯ expe-
rienced by the |Φ[a],0,0〉’s in the corresponding ED-QKD
Scheme A for those discarded and undiscarded qudits
are the same. In summary, this further modification
in Scheme C allows easier experimental implementation
than Scheme B because complete measurement in the Bλ′
basis even for N = 4 is not trivial. However, the key rate
of Scheme C will be lower than that of Scheme B since
more signals have to be discarded in step 2’. We shall
get back to this point in Sec. III B below.
Finally, we remark that it is possible to apply two-way
error correction and privacy amplification in Schemes A–
C similar to the one used in the Chau15 scheme [1]. In
fact, the conclusions on the error-tolerable capability of
the Chau15 scheme using two-way entanglement purifica-
tion in Ref. [1] is directly applicable to our three schemes.
In what follows, however, we focus on the performance
of Schemes A–C using the more practical one-way entan-
glement purification procedure [9], which gives a higher
key rate when the channel noise is low at the expense of
having a lower error-tolerable rate.
III. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE
ANALYSIS
A. The Unconditional Security Proof Of Scheme A
Recall that in Scheme A, Eve sees the same completely
mixed density matrix for the quantum state that Alice
sends to Bob in step 1 irrespective of the value of λ used.
So the quantum operation ρ 7→ E(ρ) = ∑iKiρK†i Eve
applies to the insecure quantum channel is independent
of λ, where each Kraus operator used can be written as
Ki =
∑
u,v∈GF (N) giuvXuZv for some giuv ∈ C. Since∑
iK
†
iKi = I and ZvXu = (−1)Tr(uv)XuZv [7, 17], we
have
∑
i,u,v |giuv|2 = 1 and
∑
i,u,v g
∗
iuvgi,u,v+w = 0 for all
w 6= 0. Consequently,
e˜b,c¯ = 〈Φ[a],b,c¯|E(|Φ[a],0,0〉〈Φ[a],0,0|)|Φ[a],b,c¯〉
=
∑
i
′∑
v,v′
g∗ibvgibv′ =
∑
i
′∑
v
|gibv|2 ≡
′∑
v
ebv, (8)
where the primed sum is over those variables v and/or
v′ ∈ GF (N) satisfying Tr(v) = Tr(v′) = c¯. Note
that I ⊗ XuZv|Φ[a],b,c¯〉 = I ⊗ Xu′Zv′ |Φ[a],b,c¯〉 up to an
irrelevant phase whenever u = u′ and Tr(v) = Tr(v′).
Combined with Eq. (8), we conclude that Eve’s at-
tack through E is equivalent to the quantum operation
ρ 7→ ∑u,v euvXuZvρ (XuZv)†. In this regard, we may in-
terpret euv as the probability that the qudit has experi-
enced XuZv in the insecure quantum channel.
Recall that we obtain estimates of e˜λ[b],c¯ + e˜λ([b]+1),c¯
for [b] ∈ GF (N)/GF (2), λ ∈ GF (N)∗ and c¯ ∈ GF (2)
in step 4 of Scheme A. In the infinite key length limit,
these estimates are exact. More importantly, euv’s must
be consistent with these estimates through Eq. (8). The
dimension of each qudit received by Bob is N = 2n. So
quantum Gilbert-Varshamov bound [14, 15] tells us that
the CSS code needed to perform the entanglement distil-
lation in step 5 of Scheme A exists provided that [12]
K = n−maxh2({euv}u,v∈GF (N))
≡ n+max
∑
u,v∈GF (N)
euv log2 euv > 0, (9)
where the maximum is over all euv’s in [0, 1] that are
consistent with the error rate estimates, namely, e˜λ[b],c¯+
e˜λ([b]+1),c¯ for [b] ∈ GF (N)/GF (2), λ ∈ GF (N)∗ and c¯ ∈
GF (2). Once this (random) CSS code exists, Alice and
Bob can almost surely distill out almost perfect states
each in the form |Φ[a],0,0〉.
There are a few ways to define the key rate for a QKD
protocol. Here we extend the one used for qubit transfer
in Ref. [2], which is experimentally meaningful, to qudit
transfer by defining the secret key rate as the number
of provably secure dits distilled divided by the number of
qudit transferred in the limit of an arbitrary large number
of qudit transfer. In the case of a lossless channel and
perfect detectors, the secret key rates for Scheme A and
hence also Scheme B equal
RA = RB = max(0,K/{n(N − 1)}). (10a)
Note that in the above expression, the 1/(N−1) factor is
the probability that Alice’s λ agrees with Bob’s λ′; and
the 1/n factor converts the number of secret bits to dits.
To summarize, both Schemes A and B can distill out a
secret key provided that Eq. (9) holds for all euv’s given
that they obey the constraints coming from the measure-
ment statistics in step 4 of Scheme A. Clearly, the resul-
tant secret key is composable [18, 19]. This completes
our proof of the unconditional security.
5FIG. 1. (color online) The secret key rate RB of Scheme B as a
function of e[a] and ec¯ for N = 4 using one-way entanglement
distillation.
Finally, we remark that for Scheme C, Alice and Bob
will add n bits to their raw keys if λ = λ′ and Bob’s
measurement in step 2’ is successful. As a result, the
secret key rate for Scheme C equals
RC = 2RB/N = max(0, 2K/{nN(N − 1)}). (10b)
Here, the extra factor of 2/N is the probability of having
a successful measurement in step 2’.
B. Key Rate Formulae For Schemes A–C
One may study the performance of Schemes A–C us-
ing all the parameters obtained from step 4 to constrain
euv’s. But this approach is not very fruitful. Since the
secret key comes from both [a] and c¯, it makes sense to
gauge the performance of our QKD scheme by one of the
following two sets of parameters. The first set is the av-
erage bit error rate ec¯ of the c¯’s and the average dit error
rate e[a] of the [a]’s in the raw key. (Note that both ec¯
and e[a] are averaged over λ.) The second set is simply
the bit error rate of the raw bit key string eraw.
Note that permuting the non-zero u and v indices in
euv’s does not change the values ec¯, e[a] and eraw. Com-
bined with the convexity of h2, we conclude that the
maximum in the R.H.S. of Eq. (9) is reached only if
eµ0 = eµ′0, e0ν = e0ν′ and eµν = eµ′ν′ for all µ, µ
′, ν, ν′ ∈
GF (N)∗. This observation greatly simplifies the com-
putation of K in Eq. (9) as it becomes the easily man-
ageable optimization problem involving four unknowns,
namely, A ≡ e00, B ≡
∑
ν∈GF (N)∗ e0ν/(N − 1), C ≡∑
µ∈GF (N)∗ eµ0/(N−1) andD ≡
∑
µ,ν∈GF (N)∗ eµν/(N−
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R
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 (a) Scheme B, N=4; six-state
 (b) Scheme B, N=8
 (c) BB84
 (d) Chau05, N=4
 (e) Chau05, N=8
 (f) RRDPS, N=4
 (g) RRDPS, N=8
(c)
FIG. 2. (color online) The secret key rates R as a function
of the bit error rate of the raw bit string eraw for various
PM-QKD schemes in the one-way communication setting.
Scheme B, BB84, Chau05 and RRDPS are shown in solid,
dot, dash-dot and dash curves, respectively. Note that the
six-state scheme here uses non-degenerate quantum code for
entanglement distillation.
1)2 under the constraints
0 ≤ A,B,C,D ≤ 1, (11a)
1 = A+ (N − 1)(B + C) + (N − 1)2D, (11b)
ec¯ =
N
2
{B + (N − 1)D}, (11c)
e[a] = (N − 1){C + (N − 1)D} (11d)
for the case of finding RB(ec¯, e[a]). And by putting in the
additional constraint
eraw =
1
n
{
ec¯ +
(n− 1)Ne[a]
(N − 1)(N − 2)
}
, (11e)
one could determine RB(eraw). Note that the first term
in the curly bracket in the R.H.S. of Eq. (11e) comes from
the fact that 1/n of the raw bits originates from the values
of c¯’s. For the second term,
∑
v∈GF (N) eµv = e[a]/(N−1)
for all µ ∈ GF (N)∗ so that each type of dit error in [a]
occurs at a rate of 2e[a]/(N − 1). Converting the dit [a]
to (n− 1) bits, the corresponding bit error rate becomes
2e[a]/(N−1)×(N/4)/(N/2−1). Hence, the second term
in Eq. (11e) corresponds to the contribution of bit error
rate in the value of [a].
Fig. 1 plots the secret key rate RB of Scheme B for
N = 4 using one-way classical communication for fixed
ec¯ and e[a] by numerically optimizing Eqs. (9) and (10a)
subject to the constraints in Eqs. (11a)–(11d). It shows
that the maximum tolerable error rate ec¯ (e[a]) can be
very high when e[a] (ec¯) is low. So, when e[a] is small,
6Scheme Na R(0)b emaxraw
c
BB84 [3, 9] 2 1/2 11.0%
Six-state [10, 12] 2 1/3 12.7%
Chau05 [7] 4 1/15 5.1%
8 1/63 2.5%
RRDPS [8] 4 0.041 1.0%
8 0.136 8.2%
Scheme B 4 1/3 12.6%
8 1/7 7.5%
Scheme C 4 1/6 12.6%
8 1/28 7.5%
a The Hilbert space dimension of the quantum information
carrier.
b The secret key rate in the noiseless and lossless situation.
c The maximum provably secure bit error rate of the raw key.
TABLE I. Performance of various PM-QKD schemes using
one-way entanglement distillation. Here, the emaxraw for the six-
state scheme is for the case of using degenerate quantum code
to perform entanglement distillation.
Alice and Bob may drop all the raw bits originated from
[a]’s and use only the raw bits originated from c¯’s to distill
the secret key similar to the method used in Ref. [1]. In
this way, the maximum tolerable ec¯ can be as large as
1/2 at the expense of having a very low secret key rate.
Similar conclusion is drawn when ec¯ is small as Alice
and Bob may keep only those raw bits generated from
the measurement of [a]’s. However, we shall not pursue
further along this direction here.
C. Comparison With Other Provably Secure
PM-QKD Schemes
We now compare the performance of Scheme B with
a few well-known qubit- and qudit-based PM-QKD
schemes. And we focus our comparison for the case when
the quantum channel is lossless and that the detectors are
prefect without dark counts and dead time in the limit
of an infinitely long raw key. (We shall briefly discuss
photon insertion loss in the experimental apparatus to-
ward the end of this subsection.) In addition, we only
consider the case of one-way privacy amplification. For
qubit-based schemes, we choose the BB84 [3] and the six-
state schemes [10]. Note that for qudit-based PM-QKD
schemes, unconditional security proofs are known only
for a few of them. The representative examples are the
Chau05 scheme [7] and the RRDPS scheme [8]. That is
why we choose these two in our comparison.
Fig. 2 depicts the secret key rates R for various PM-
QKD schemes using one-way entanglement distillation
with non-degenerate quantum code as a function of eraw.
And Table I summarizes the values of R when eraw = 0 as
well as the maximum provably secure bit error rate of the
raw key for these schemes. For the cases of N = 4 and
8 in Scheme B, the secret key rates are computed by a
similar numerical optimization procedure used to obtain
Fig. 1. (For Scheme C in both cases, the rate is one half of
that for Scheme B.) It shows that the maximum provably
secure bit error rate eraw decreases as N increases.
The most eye-catching feature in Fig. 2 is that the
secret key rates of the six-state scheme [10] and Scheme B
for N = 4 seem to agree. (That is to say, for N = 4,
Scheme B and hence Scheme C can tolerate up to 12.6%
bit error rate [12].) Here we prove that it is indeed the
case.
First, there is a unique property for N = 4, namely,
that the bit error rate of the raw key eraw in Eq. (11e) is
unaltered by swapping eµ0 with e0µ for all µ ∈ GF (N)∗
although this swapping may change the values of ec¯ and
e[a]. By convexity of h2, the value of K in Eq. (9) is
minimized only if B = C. Thus, Eq. (9) can be writ-
ten as an extremization over a single variable D af-
ter eliminating A and B via the constraints given by
Eqs. (11b)–(11e). By finding the turning point of the
resultant expression as a function of D, we conclude
that K is minimized when D = e2raw/4 [and hence
B = C = eraw/2 − 3e2raw/4 = (eraw/2)(1 − 3eraw/2) and
A = 1− 3eraw + 9e2raw/4 = (1− 3eraw/2)2]. Upon simpli-
fication, we have
K = 2+ A log2A+ 3B log2B + 3C log2 C + 9D log2D
= 2
{
1 +
(
1− 3eraw
2
)
log2
(
1− 3eraw
2
)
+
3eraw
2
log2
(eraw
2
)}
. (12)
From Eq. (10a), we conclude that the secret key rate
of Scheme B as a function of eraw is the same as that of
the six-state scheme by one-way entanglement distillation
using non-degenerate codes [12]. We do not believe that
this is coincidental for these two very different schemes
to have the same secret key rate. But we have no idea
why.
The most error-tolerant PM-QKD scheme using N -
dimensional qudits is the Chau05 scheme, which can tol-
erate up to eraw = 35.6% using two-way classical commu-
nication for N = 4 [7]. To find the maximum tolerable
error rate using one-way communication for the Chau05
scheme, we use the fact that the scheme effectively de-
polarizes the quantum error so that euv = eu′v′ for all
(u, v), (u′, v′) 6= (0, 0). Hence, Eq. (9) becomes
K = n+ e00 log2 e00 + (1 − e00) log2
(
1− e00
N2 − 1
)
. (13)
When N = 4, K = 0 at e00 = 0.710. Thus, the Chau05
scheme using one-way entanglement distillation can tol-
erate up to (1− e00)N/(N2− 1)× (N/2)/(N− 1) = 5.1%
bit error rate for N = 4. By the same analysis, the
Chau05 scheme using one-way entanglement distillation
can tolerate up to 2.5% bit error rate.
For the RRDPS scheme using N -dimensional qudits
with one-way privacy amplification, the secret key rate is
7given by [8]
RRRDPS =
1
log2N
{
1− h2( 1
N − 1)− h2(eraw)
}
, (14)
where h2(e) = −e log2 e − (1 − e) log2(1 − e). (Note
that the extra 1/ log2N factor, which does not appear
in Ref. [8], converts the number of bits to the number of
dits in the raw key.) That is to say, it can tolerate up
to a bit error rate of 1.0% and 8.2% for N = 4 and 8,
respectively.
These findings are summarized in Fig. 2 and Table I.
They show that, for both N = 4 and 8, the error-tolerant
capability of Schemes B and C using one-way classical
communication is better than the Chau05 [7] and the
RRDPS [8] schemes. Table I also shows the secret key
rate in the noiseless situation. In this situation, and for
N = 4, the secret key rate of Scheme B is the same
as that of the six-state scheme and is much higher than
those of the Chau05 [7] and the RRDPS [8] schemes but
lower than the BB84 [3]. All in all, we conclude that in
terms of the secret key rate in the noiseless limit and the
maximum tolerable provably secure bit error rate of the
raw key using one-way entanglement distillation, both
Schemes B and C can be ranked among the best all-
rounded PM-QKD schemes for N = 4. Therefore, from
Fig. 2, when restricted to one-way entanglement distilla-
tion, the most economical way for Alice and Bob to share
their secret key is to use the BB84 in case the channel
noise is low (when eraw <∼ 9%) and either the six-state
scheme or Scheme B with N = 4 if the channel noise is
high (when 9% <∼ eraw <∼ 12%) provided that errors and
losses in the labs of Alice and Bob are negligibly small.
For actual experimental setup, we have already pointed
out that the state preparation of Schemes B and C is
the same as that of the Chau15 scheme in Ref. [1]. For
Scheme B, the measurement is more complicated than
in Ref. [1] for the present scheme requires complete mea-
surement. The measurement can either be done by active
or passive basis selection, the latter case can be done by
adapting the method used by Muller et al. in Ref. [20]
using (N−1)N photon detectors, which is barely feasible
though not very economical for N = 4 due to the large
number of detectors required. Whereas for Scheme C, the
measurement can be done in exactly the same way as in
the Chau15 scheme [1], which can be directly adapted
from the measurement part of various RRDPS experi-
ments [21–23]. It is instructive to carry out actual exper-
iments using Schemes B and C and compare their per-
formances with that of the six-state scheme; and we are
going to do so.
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